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LIMITING HIGHWAY ACCESS
By ROBERT R. BowIE*
The threat of commercial exploitation along the newly-
completed Ritchie and Philadelphia highways has recently
focussed public attention on the problem of unrestricted
roadside development," but the problem itself is not new.
For many years, as traffic has increased, the blight of
such development has spread unimpeded along the main
traffic arteries of the State. Gasoline stations, lunch rooms,
stores, dance-halls, billboards and other commercial en-
terprises have multiplied until, in extreme cases such as
the Baltimore-Washington Boulevard, they stretch in prac-
tically unbroken series along the whole length of the high-
way.2
Until lately, criticism of such development was confined
largely to garden clubs and similar organizations, and it
centered on the destruction of the natural beauty of the
rural landscape. Since over one-half of all motoring is
estimated to be for recreational purposes, the preservation
* Of the Baltimore City Bar. A. B., 1931, Princeton University; LL. B.,
1934, Harvard University.
'See editorials in the Baltimore Sun on October 24, 1939, November 5,
1939, January 26, 1940, and February 13, 1940. On November 6, 1939,
Mr. Ezra B. Whitman, Chairman of the Stafe Roads Commission, an-
nounced that, in order to stop commercialization along the Ritchie and
Philadelphia Roads, the Commission would refuse "to issue permits al-
lowing prospective owners of filling stations and other commercial road-
side enterprises to build approaches to their property from [these1 State
roads". Baltimore Sun, November 7, 1939, 22 and 7. See also news arti-
cles in the Sun, October 31, 1939, 26 and 21, January 26, 1940, 26, Febru-
ary 15, 1940, 24 and 11 and the Evening Sun, December 14, 1939, 40 and 16.
IAlong the 30.5 miles of the Washington Boulevard outside of Baltimore
and Washington, there are six hundred and eighteen business estab-
lishments, or an average of one every five hundred and twenty feet on
each side of the highway, in addition to six hundred and sixty-five rest-
dnces and innumerable billboards and signs. See Death, Traffic and
Dollar8 (Baltimore-Washington Boulevard Association, 1939), 2.
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of such scenery is a desirable end in itself and, in addition,
is a valuable economic asset in attracting tourists.'
Within recent years, however, additional detrimental
effects of this roadside blight, besides the esthetic, have
been pointed out by traffic engineers and safety groups.
Various studies have shown that the numerous entrances
to the highway, the frequent drawing in and out of the
traffic stream, the parking, and the increased pedestrian
traffic, all engendered by commercial use of the roadside,
jointly conspire to reduce substantially the traffic capacity
of the highway and to promote congestion, and to cause
a large proportion of the highway accidents.'
This toll in congestion and accidents, as well as blight
of the rural amenities, seems an excessive price for un-
restricted roadside development. Unless such progres-
sive deterioration can be prevented, existing and future
major highways will rapidly become obsolescent and re-
quire replacement by newer highways doomed in their
turn to similar decay. Thus, to relieve the present con-
ditions on the Washington Boulevard will require a com-
pletely new road largely paralleling the existing one.3
The cost of modern highways makes such a course too ex-
travagant to be justified unless their permanence is as-
sured. Some method to preserve the safety, traffic ca-
pacity, and attractiveness of the highways is therefore
essential.
'Motor travel for recreational and social purposes has been estimated
to represent 61 per cent of all travel on rural trunk lines and 53 per cent
of all travel on county and local roads. The Utility and Recreational
Use of Highways, by D. Grant Mickle (Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth
Annual (Michigan) Highway Conference (1938) 36-45).
'See Divided Highways and Freeways, by Arnold H. Vey (Proceedings
of the Twenty-fourth Annual (Michigan) Highway Conference (1938)
140-151) ; The Problem of the Roadside (New England Regional
Planning Commission, 1939) ; Unfit for Modern Motor Traffic, Fortune,
V. XIV, No. 2 (August 1936) 85; Bulletin No. 23 (American Road Build-
ers Association, 1931) pp. 3 and 33. Unpublished studies by the Chicago
Park District Commission and the Long Island State Park Commission of
limited access highways and parkways under their control have clearly
shown the increased safety and capacity of such roads.





Basically the problem is to prevent the use of abutting
land to exploit the highway traffic for commercial pur-
poses. This can be done either (1) by directly controlling
the use of the abutting land, or (2) since such exploita-
tion requires access to and from the highway (except for
billboards), by restricting the right of access from such
land, or (3) by a combination of both use and access con-
trol. Various measures based on one or the other of these
methods have been tried or suggested. Although this arti-
cle is concerned only with the legal questions raised by
restrictions on the access from abutting land, a very brief
reference to the different types of measures may give per-
spective in considering that problem.'
Dating back forty. years or more, the earliest is the
parkway, in which the roadway is flanked on either side
by wide strips in public ownership. Most widely devel-
oped in Westchester County and on Long Island, in New
York State, and to a lesser extent in Chicago and Metro-
politan Boston,7 the parkway is expensive and feasible
only for scenic routes along new rights of way.8 Because
the wide borders of abutting land are publicly owned,
commercialization along or near the road can not occur.9
6 Detailed consideration of the various measures and their respective
uses and advantages is impractical and unnecessary for present purposes.
Moreover, the subsequent legal discussion is confined to the constitutional
problems inherent in restricting highway access and does not attempt to
consider whether the State Roads Commission now has the statutory
authority (1) to lay out limited access ways or parkways (see Md. Code
Supp. (1935) Art. 89 B, Sec. 3, and Bouis v. Baltimore, 138 Md. 284, 113
A. 852 (1921)) or (2) to restrict access from abutting land to existing
highways under its power to make "such regulations . . . as it may deem
necessary for the preservation of State Roads" (Md. Code Supp. (1935)
Art. 89 B, Sec. 27) and its control over openings in the highway (Md. Code
Supp. (1935) Art. 89 B, Sec. 8) or other powers.
See Nolen and Hubbard, Parkway8 and Land Values (Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1937); Information Bulletin No. 36 (N. Y. Regional Plan
Association, Inc., June, 1937).
8 For a new route between Baltimore and Washington, a parkway lo-
cated largely within existing governmental reservations has been sug-
gested. See Battimore-Washington-Annapoli8 Area, op. cit. supra, n. 5,
and the Baltimore Sun, February 15, 1940, pp. 24 and 11.
0 Whether land adjacent to the parkway still has a right of access
across the publicly owned borders to the roadway depends on the statu-
tory authority under which the parkway is constructed. See Anzalone
v. Metropolitan District Commission, 257 Mass. 32, 153 N. E. 325, 47 A. L. R.
897 (1926) ; Metropolitan District Commission v. Cataldo, 257 Mass. 38,
1940]
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The second general method, known as "highway zon-
ing," relies on public regulation of the use of abutting
land in private hands, in place of public ownership. 10 Al-
though successfully used in certain California counties,"'
and other scattered districts in the United States,'12 the
most important application of this type of control at pres-
ent is the English Restriction of Ribbon Development Act,
1935."8 Under this Act, the use of land within two hun-
dred and twenty feet of the center of the main highways
is restricted, subject to broad administrative discretion to
permit non-injurious uses. 4 Statutes proposed in this
country for this purpose generally conform more closely
to the zoning statute pattern and provide for districting
and use regulations instead of broad administrative dis-
cretion.15  Such highway zoning raises various legal ques-
tions common to all zoning regulation and also some ques-
tions of delegation of power to administrative agencies but
both are outside of the scope of this article.
153 N. E. 328 (1926) ; Burke v. Metropolitan District Commission, 262 Mass.
70, 159 N. E. 739 (1928) ; Gleason v. Metropolitan Dist. Commission, 270
Mass. 377, 170 N. P7. 395 (1930).
10 Laws regulating the locations of billboards or particular businesses
such as gasoline stations or motor junk yards along the highways are
special forms of restriction on abutting land use. Billboard statutes are
collected in Roadside Improvement (American Civic and Planning Asso-
ciation, 1938) 18-23. For forms of junk yard and gasoline station stat-
utes, see Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1935) Secs. 1238c-1248c, and Conn. Gen.
Stat., Sees. 1659-1667, amended by (Supp. 1935) Secs. 644c-648c and (Supp.
1937) Sec. 359d.
"I Quarterly Bulletin (American Nature Association), V. 1, No. 2 (July
1938).
12 Such as Spokane County, Washington, and Glynn County, Georgia.
The Roadside Bulletin (National Roadside Council), V. 6, No. 1 (October
1939), 26-7. Connecticut has adopted a general enabling act permit-
ting towns and boroughs to establish non-commercial zones for the pur-
pose, inter alia, of regulating "distracting hazards to safe motor vehicle
operation and general traffic upon the highway" (Acts of 1931, Ch. 267;
Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1935), Secs. 89c-92c). Apparently, however,
only one town has used this power to prevent highway ribbon develop-
ment. Roadside Bulletin, V. 5, No. 1 (June 1937), pp. 28-29.
13 25 & 26 Geo. 5., Ch. 47.
11 Sections 2 and 7. Section 9 provides for compensation under cer-
tain narrowly restricted circumstances.
16 Model acts for state highway zoning have been drafted and proposed
by the American Civic and Planning Association (see Roadside Improve-
ment, op. cit. supra, n. 10, pp. 11 to 13); the American Society of
Planning Officials (mimeo.) ; and the American Automobile Asso-
ciation (Suggested Uniform Act for Roadside Development and Control,
1938, amended in 1939 and, at the AAA annual meeting in November




In addition to the regulation of the use of the land,
both the English Act and two of the proposed acts impose
restrictions on the right of access from abutting property.
In the English Act,16 access, like land use, is subject to
administrative control, while the proposed American acts
contemplate general regulations of the number, location,
design and construction of means of access.17 The extent
to which such restrictions may limit or abolish the access
from abutting land to the highway without compensation
depends, of course, on the nature and extent of the abut-
ting owner's rights.
The third and newest type of control, the "limited ac-
cess" highway, relies exclusively on restriction of access,
and for practical purposes abolishes all rights of access
from abutting land. In this way the highway is insulated
from the abutting land, and exploitive uses, except bill-
boards, can not arise along the margin. Within the last
three years, statutes authorizing limited access highways
have been passed in California, 18 Connecticut, 9 New York,
°2
Rhode Island,21 and West Virginia.2 2 While the New York
and Connecticut laws appear to authorize establishment
only on new rights of way, the California, Rhode Island and
West Virginia statutes expressly permit the designation of
existing roads as limited access roads, and authorize the
extinguishment of existing rights of access by purchase or
condemnation.23
16 Sections 2 and 7. See supra n. 14.
17 American Society of Planning Officials, Draft Act, Sections 5 and 13;
American Planning and Civic Association, Proposed Act, Section 3. While
in many states a permit from the highway commission is now required
for opening new means of access to the highways, such control is gen-
erally applied only to the design and not the number of such approaches.
28 Streets and Highways Code (California), Secs. 23.5, 100.1, 100.2, and
100.3 (Statutes of 1939, Ch. 687) ; see also Cal. Gen. Laws, Act 8202 (Stat-
utes of 1939, Ch. 359).
19Laws of 1939 (Conn.), Ch. 307.
'ON. Y. Highway Law, Sees. 3 and 30 (as amended by Laws of 1937,
Ch. 248).
21 General Laws of Rhode Island (1938), Ch. 75 (Public Laws of 1937,
Ch. 2537).
22 W. Va. Code (1939 Supp.), Sees. 1474 (21) to 1474 (24), inclusive,
(Acts of 1939, Ch. 110).
Is A Model Act proposed by the American Planning and Civic Associa-
tion also applies to existing roads. The Constitution of California and
West Virginia, it should be noted, require compensation for damage to
private property as well as for a taking. Const. of California, Art. I,
Sec. 14; Const. of West Virginia, Art. III, See. 9.
19401
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Establishment of such roads on new rights of way would
not involve legal problems since the right of access of
abutters, if any, can be acquired along with the necessary
land and the question of the extent of such rights will
not arise.sa When an existing road is so designated, how-
ever, the abutting owner will be prevented from making
a new means of access and his existing access may be
closed.
To what extent then may the access of the abutting
owner on an existing highway be cut off or restricted either
under a limited access highway statute or pursuant to a
highway zoning or permit statute, without paying to the
owner compensation under Section 40, of Article III, of
the Maryland Constitution?
II.
Before taking up the cases on this question, attention
may be called to several general considerations. In the
first place, it is important to bear constantly in mind the
fact that the Maryland Constitution requires compensation
only for a "taking" of private property for a public pur-
pose and not for mere "damaging" or "injuring".24  Many
of the other states, beginning as far back as 1870 have
amended the eminent domain provisions of their constitu-
tions to include "damaging" as well as "taking" but, as
the Court of Appeals has several times pointed out, Mary-
land has not done so.25  Consequently, in Maryland, pri-
23a When, in widening and regrading an existing street, a part of an
abutting lot is actually taken and the remainder left much above the
former street level, compensation may be recovered for the resulting in-jury to the beneficial use of the remainder, measured by restoring it to
its former relative condition, as well as for the property actually taken,
Baltimore v. Garrett, 120 Md. 608, 87 A. 1057 (1913). This rule, it should
be noticed, does not deal with the question of what constitutes a taking,
which is the subject of this article, but merely fixes the measure of
damages when a taking has admittedly occurred.2
,Art. III, Sec. 40 of the Maryland Constitution provides: "Sec. 40.
The General Assembly shall enact no Law authorizing private property
to be taken for public use, without just compensation as agreed upon
between the parties, or awarded by a jury, being first paid or tendered
to the party entitled to such compensation."
25 Krebs v. State Roads Comm., 160 Md. 584, 588, 594, 154 A. 131, 133,
135 (1931); Brehm v. State Roads Commission, 176 Md. 411, 414, 5 A.
(2d) 820, 821 (1939). Such amendments have been adopted In ap-
proximately one-half of the States.
[VOL. IV224
LIMITING HIGHWAY ACCESS
vate individuals may suffer substantial loss or injury as
a result of lawful public action without being thereby en-
titled to compensation.
In the second place, any restriction upon access im-
posed under statutes of the sort here under consideration
is clearly done for the public purpose of protecting the
safety and traffic capacity of the highway. as a highway.
Consequently cases in which an abutter's access to the
highway from his property is obstructed by a private in-
dividual for his own purposes, either on his own responsi-
bility, 6 or under permission from a public authority,27
have no present bearing. Equally inapplicable are cases
dealing with the right of the abutting owner to damages
when his access is blocked or impaired through wrongful
failure of the public authority to keep the streets or roads
in repair.28 In neither class of cases is the restriction of
access imposed for a public purpose. A final group of
cases to be distinguished includes those involving the use
of the highway for a public but non-highway purpose
which affects the abutter's access, such as railroad tracks
or telephone or telegraph poles.29
The restrictions on access here involved are not im-
posed either for a private or non-highway purpose. On
the contrary, they are required to prevent the abutting
26 See, e. g., Houck v. Wachter, 34 Md. 265 (1871) (Even then the
abutting owner must show special damage different from the public's,
such as that the road is only means of access) ; Crook v. Pitcher, 61 Md.
510 (1884).
11 See, e. g., Van Witsen et al. v. Gutman, 79 Md. 405, 29 A. 608, 24
L. R. A. 403 (1894) (closing of alley for private benefit enjoined) ; Towns-
end, Grace & Co. v. Epstein, 93 Md. 537, 49 A. 629, 86 A. S. R. 441, 52
L. R. A. 409 (1901) (private bridge over street enjoined) ; Huebschmann
v. Grand Company, 166 Md. 615, 172 A. 227 (1934) (building extension
partly into street enjoined).
28 See, e. g., Bembe v. Anne Arundel County, 94 Md. 321, 51 A. 179 (1902)
(damages allowed where sole means of access blocked by non-repair);
Johnson v. Oakland, 148 Md. 432, 129 A. 648 (1925) (non-repair creating
cul-de-sac destroyed abutter's business).
20 See, e. g., B. & P. R. R. Co. v. Reaney, 42 Md. 117 (1875) (railroad
tunnel) ; Phipps, Adm'r., et al. v. West. Maryland Railroad Co., 66 Md.
319, 7 A. 556 (1887) (railroad tracks) ; Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone
Co. v. Mackenzie, 74 Md. 36, 21 A. 690 (1891) (telephone poles) ; Webb
v. Balto. & Ohio R. Co., 114 Md. 216, 79 A. 193 (1910) (railroad tracks) ;
Telephone Co. v. Tyson, 160 Md. 298, 153 A. 271 (1931) (telephone poles).
Cf. Peddlcord v. Balt., Catonsville & Ellicott's Mills Pass. R. Co., 34 Md.
463 (1871); Hodges v. Balto. Union P. Ry. Co., 58 Md. 603 (1882)
(horse car tracks not an additional servitude).
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owner from exploiting the highway for his private gain
as a market place. In other words, they seek to preserve
the highway as such and to prevent its use for other
purposes essentially private which interfere with the
safety and the travel of the general public on the high-
way.
Consequently none of the foregoing cases is relevant
to the solution of the present problem. General expres-
sions in such cases as to the rights of an abutter must be
interpreted in the light of the facts dealt with. 0 An
abutter's right to have his access protected against inter-
ference arising from a private purpose, or from unlaw-
ful neglect of public duty, or from non-highway uses, does
not necessarily give him the right to interfere for his
private purposes with the proper use of the highway by
the public.
III.
Consideration must therefore be restricted to cases in
which the abutting owner's access has been interfered
with by lawful actions done to promote the use and main-
tenance of the highway as a highway. To simplify dis-
cussion these cases may be divided into four groups (1)
cases involving safety measures on the highway; (2) cases
involving changes in the grade of the highway; (3) cases
involving viaducts or similar structures in the highway;
and (4) cases involving closing or relocation of the high-
way. These may be taken up in turn.
80 See, e. g., Van Witsen et al. v. Gutman, 79 Md. 405, 409, 411, 29 A.
608, 609 (1894); Townsend, Grace & Co., v. Epstein, 93 Md. 537, 550-2,
but cf. 557, 49 A. 629, 631, but cf. 634, 86 A. S. R. 441, 450, but cf. 451.
52 L. R. A. 409, 411, but cf. 413 (1901); Huebschmann v. Grand Corn-
pany, 166 Md. 615, 628, 172 A. 227, 233 (1934). Each of these cases in-
volved use of the street for a private purpose.
In Krebs v. State Roads Commn., 160 Md. 584, 593, 154 A. 131, 135(1931), however, the Court, in expressly repudiating such dicta to the
effect that an abutter had an independent private interest in the high-
way, said: "Expressions used in the course of argument in some of the
opinions may, perhaps, be difficult to reconcile with each other; but, if
we take the decisions and essential reasons, which alone should con-




Protection of the Highway.
In general, the public authority charged with care of
streets or highways is not liable to abutting owners for
damage caused by improvements to protect the highway
if they are made with due care. Thus, if the public au-
thority, in order to prevent the flooding of a highway ad-
jacent to a stream builds a dike or wall along the bank,
and a mill on the stream is injured by the additional water
so backed up, the owner has no claim for damages. 1 On
the other hand, if the improvement concentrates water
from elsewhere and drains it over the abutting owner's
land in such large quantities that he is deprived of its
use, that amounts to a taking for which compensation is
payable.32
Two cases illustrate the application of these principles
to protective structures, which interfere with an abutter's
access. In Textor v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Company,3 3 plaintiff owned a corner property abutting
on two streets, on one of which railroad tracks had been
laid. To protect traffic at the grade crossing, the defendant
railroad, with the approval of the city, proposed to erect
safety gates. Plaintiff sought to enjoin, claiming that when
up, the gates extended three feet in front of his door, and
that when down, they projected five feet and also pre-
vented access to the entrance to his lumber yard on the
street containing the railroad tracks. Assuming that the
location was reasonably selected, the Court refused relief
on the ground that the city had full power to provide for
safety devices on the highway, observing:
"The streets are under the exclusive control of the
city as avenues of travel; and whatever precaution
may be reasonably taken to secure the safety of those
who use them is but effectuating the object of such
highways and discharging a corporate responsibility. ' '3
Tyson v. Commissioners of Baltimore County, 28 Md. 510 (1868);
Walter v. Wicomico Co., 35 Md. 385 (1872).
as Guest v. Church Hill, 90 Md. 689, 45 A. 882 (1900).
"s 59 Md. 63, 43 A- R. 540 (1882).
a4 59 Md. 63, 64, 43 A. U. 540, 541 (1S82).
1940]
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This decision clearly establishes the fundamental public
right to restrict an abutter's access for the protection of
the highway users.
The second case dealing with highway safety devices,
DeLauder v. The County Commissioners of Baltimore
County,85 reveals the basic limitation on this power. In
that case, the plaintiff owned a farm which was separated
into two parcels. Between the parcels ran the Little Gun-
powder Falls, a narrow strip of land owned by another,
parallel to the Falls, and a public road. One-half of the
farm abutted on the road but the only access to the other
half was by a right of way twenty feet wide over the
Falls and across the intervening strip to the road. In re-
pairing a drain in the road, the County Commissioners
built a culvert, raising the level of the road about four
feet opposite plaintiff's right of way, and erected a rail-
ing along this raised portion directly blocking the entire
right of way. Plaintiff sued for the destruction of this
right of way. The Court of Appeals allowed recovery on
the ground that the total destruction of the private right
of way amounted to a "taking". In its opinion, the Court
emphasized the fact that the right of way over another's
land was itself property which was destroyed by the
highway barrier, and indicated that the location of the
railing was unnecessarily injurious to the plaintiff's rights.
The case is unusual since the land deprived of access did
not abut the highway but was connected with it by the
private right of way destroyed. Subsequent cases, in dis-
cussing this case, have stressed the facts involved and the
total destruction of all possible use of the right of way."
Change of the Highway Grade.
Cases involving a change in the grade of the highway
-affecting the access of abutting owners provide close analo-
gies to the problem under discussion. Since such changes
are an assertion of the superior rights of the travelling
8594 Md. 1, 50 A. 427 (1901).
11 See M. & C. C. of Balto. v. Bregenzer, 125 Md. 78, 85, 93 A. 425, 427
(1915) ; Baltimore v. Dobler, 140 Md. 634, 645, 118 A. 168, 172 (1922)
Smith v. Balto. & Ohio R. Co., 168 Md. 89, 94, 176 A. 642, 644 (1935).
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public in the highway over the interests of abutting own-
ers, the decisions in this field should provide a fair index
of the probable attitude of the Court to restrictions on ac-
cess for the protection of the highway and its users.
Although two earlier cases denied the abutting owner
damages for interference with his access resulting from
lawful reductions in highway grades, 7 the first case fully
discussing the question of injuries due to grading was
Mayor and C. C. of Cumberland v. Willison,8 8 which is
considered a leading case on the topic although the par-
ticular injury involved was not interference with access.
After stating the general principle that consequential dam-
ages do not require compensation, the Court then said:
"Upon this principle it has been decided by a great
preponderance of authority that municipal corpora-
tions acting under authority conferred by the Legis-
lature to make and repair, or to grade, level, and im-
prove streets, if they exercise reasonable care and skill
in the performance of the work resolved upon, are
not answerable to the adjoining owner whose lands
are not actually taken, for consequential damages to
his premises, even though in grading and leveling the
street a portion of the adjoining lot in consequence
of the removal of its natural support falls into the
highway, and the same immunity exists if the street
be embanked or raised so as to cut off, or render diffi-
cult the access to the adjacent property, and this, too,
although the grade of the street had been before es-
tablished and the adjoining property owner had erect-
ed buildings or made improvements with reference
to such grade. Property thus injured is not in the
constitutional sense taken for public use.... So far,
therefore, as injury to the private owner consists in
leaving his property above or below the grade of a
street, so as to cut off or render difficult the access
thereto, and so far as its value or its convenient and
comfortable enjoyment may be impaired in conse-
quence of such grading or change thereof from time
to time, the law seems to be well settled, and if the
8' Douglass v. Turnpike *Co., 22 Md. 219, 85 A. D. 647 (1864); Ped-
dicord v. Balt., Catonsville & Ellicott's Mills Pass. R. Co., 34 Md. 463
(1871).
8 50 Md. 138, 33 A. R. 304 (1878).
1940]
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injury complained of in this case 'were of that char-
acter we should have no difficulty whatever in hold-
ing that the city was not responsible therefor."'39
Applying this principle to the facts before it, the Court
held that interference with the flow of a mill-race result-
ing from regrading of streets did not entitle the owner
to damages. The same principle was applied in O'Brien
v. Baltimore Belt Railroad Company,40 where a deep rail-
way cut in the street opposite plaintiff's property, which
narrowed the street to one-half its former width, was held
not to be a taking.
In the next two cases, the abutting owner alleged that
the highway involved provided the only means of access
to his property and that the regrading deprived, him of
free access and beneficial enjoyment of the property.4'
In the Green case, a fill of six feet was made, and in the
Offutt case, a cut of seven feet. Nevertheless, in both cases
the Court held that the damages were merely consequen-
tial and did not amount to a "taking" within Article III,
Section 40.
The extent and limits of this doctrine are clearly shown
by the cases of Sanderson v. Baltimore42 and Baltimore
v. Dobler43 which were decided within two years of each
other. In the Sanderson case, the plaintiff built a home on
a corner lot which fronted on two streets and an alley.
Years later, the City graded the streets by excavating
from fourteen to seventeen feet from one street, and from
sixteen to thirty feet on the other, and cutting off both
ends of the alley, thereby depriving the owner of all vehicu-
lar access to the property and all individual access except
-- 50 Md. 138, 148-149, 33 A. R. 304, 307-308 (italicizing of "cut off"
added).
4074 Md. 363, 22 A. 141, 13 L. R. A. 126 (1891). Likewise, in. Poole v.
Falls Road Ry. Co., 88 Md. 533, 41 A. 1069 (1898), the placing of street
car tracks on a narrow street leaving insufficient space between the
tracks and curb to permit passing or parking of vehicles was held not
a taking.
41 Green v. City and Suburban Railway Co., 78 Md. 294, 28 A. 626, 44
A. S. R. 288 (1894); Offutt v. Montgomery County, 94 Md. 115, 50 A.
419 (1901).
2 135 Md. 509, 109 A. 425 (1920).
-3 140 Md. 634, 118 A. 168 (1922).
230 [VOL. IV
LIMITING HIGHWAY ACCESS
by a steep ladder. After reviewing the cases denying lia-
bility for inconvenience or expense resulting from grad-
ing, the Court allowed recovery, stating in its opinion that
the extreme excavation on all sides
"has resulted in the practical destruction of access to
her property, and we are of opinion that, under the
principles declared in DeLauder's case, supra, and in
Walters v. B. & 0. R. R., 120 Md. 644, the injury
amounts to or is equivalent to the taking of private
property without making just compensation therefor
to the owner."
44
Decided two years later, Baltimore v. Dobler45 comple-
ments the Sanderson case. The lot there involved was un-
improved and ran the full depth of the block (466 feet)
between two parallel streets, fronting three hundred and
fifteen feet on each street. In connection with an exten-
sion of the belt line railroad, the City lowered the grade
on one of these streets to twenty feet below the level of
the plaintiff's lot, resulting, according to the plaintiff, in
damage of $50,000. In holding that there was no "tak-
ing" requiring compensation the Court stated:
"The controlling facts in the case are as follows:
"1. There is no physical taking of any part of the
lot.
"2. There is no destruction of plaintiff's easement
in the use of the street.
"3. There are no improvements erected on the lot
on Clement Street, the reasonable use and enjoyment
of which would be destroyed by the proposed regrad-
ing.
"4. There is a wide front of the lot on another
street, so that ingress to and egress from the lot does
not depend upon convenient access to Clement
Street."4
The Court distinguished the DeLauder, and the Walters
cases on the ground that in each, access had been com-
' 135 Md. 509, 523, 109 A. 425, 430 (1920).
Supra, n. 43.
40140 Md. 634, 643, 118 A. 168, 171 (1922) (italics added).
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pletely barred, and the Sanderson case on the ground that
the destruction of all access
"practically destroyed plaintiff's home and amounted
to a taking.' 47
Expressly stating that the facts presented by this case
fell within the principles announced in the case of Cum-
berland v. Willison,48 the Court denied the owner relief.
Of the four factors enumerated by the Court as con-
trolling, the fourth was apparently the crucial one on which
the case turned. In the subsequent case of Dobler v. Bal-
timore,49 seeking recovery for the same damage on a dif-
ferent theory, the Court summarized its prior decision as
holding
"that a change in the grade of a street made by a
municipal corporation under statutory authority,
where abutting property is rendered more difficult of
access, without, however, destruction of all means of
ingress and egress, does not involve a taking of prop-
erty within the meaning of the constitutional prohi-
bition of the taking of private property for public use
without compensation." 50
This line of distinction has been adhered to in later
cases. Thus in Baltimore v. Marine Works,51 the plaintiff
leased a lot and building abutting on three streets on each
of which it had entrances used for its heavy trucks. When
grading lowered the street level on two of the streets vary-
ing amounts from three to five feet, truck entrances from
these streets became impractical and plaintiff claimed a
taking. Pointing out that even though his truck entrances
were closed, plaintiff was still not completely deprived of
the use of any of the streets, the Court held that there was
no taking and that the hardship was not as great as in other
cases where recovery had also been denied. It specifically
stated that the DeLauder, Walters, and Sanderson cases
7 140 Md. 634, 646, 118 A. 168, 173 (1922).
18 Supra, n. 38.
'p151 Md. 154, 134 A. 201 (1926).
50 151 Md. 154, 159-160, 134 A. 201, 203 (1926) (italics added).
521 152 Md. 367, 136 A. 829 (1927).
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did not vary the rules of law laid down in the other cases
but that the differences were "in the findings on the
facts".2
In the most recent case on change of grade, Smith v.
Balto. & Ohio R. Co.,58 the road in front of a filling sta-
tion had been raised about a foot in providing an approach
for a grade crossing elimination, thereby causing the sta-
tion owner a loss of business. Following its earlier deci-
sions in denying recovery, the Court, in an opinion by
Judge Parke commented on the general rule as follows:
"The theory adopted by the court is that, when a high-
way is acquired by gift, purchase, or the exercise of
the power of eminent domain, it was an implication
of the acquisition, in whatever form, by the public
agency, that the land acquired for the highway would
and could be used not only for passage by the public,
but also for its repair and alteration of surface, from
time to time, as the public needs might require. The
owners of land along streets and highways are charged
with a knowledge of this right of the public to repair
and change the surface of the highway, and, so, this
principle applies to such proprietors, who must be
held to have contemplated, at the time when title was
acquired, and so to have assumed the lawful contin-
gencies implicit in the location of their properties.
Moreover, since consequential damages resulting to
land from a mere change of grade, without any physi-
cal injury to the property itself, is not a taking with-
in the meaning of the Constitution (Article 3, Sec.
40), the abutting landowner has no right of action, if
the work is authorized by law, and is skillfully and
not negligently done."54
Since the superior public right is "an implication of
the acquisition" which the owner "is held to have con-
templated", it is apparent that actual intention or expec-
tation is immaterial. Indeed, while an abutting owner
may contemplate minor changes, it is hardly likely that
as a matter of actual fact, he expects changes like those
in the Dobler case. In effect, therefore, this explanation
"152 Md. 367, 371, 136 A. 829, 830 (1927).
"168 Md. 89, 176 A. 642 (1935).
"168 Md. 89, 92-3, 176 A. 642, 643-4 (1935).
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recognizes that the public rights in the highway are para-
mount to those of the abutting owner.15 Consequently any
changes in its use or structure to improve or protect it as
a highway, whether originally contemplated or not, must
be suffered by the abutting owner without compensation,
unless their effect is to deprive him of the entire use and
enjoyment of his property. In the case of injury to ac-
cess this can only occur where the owner is cut off from
all access to the general network of public roads.
Highway Viaducts
Closely akin to the change of grade cases are those in-
volving viaducts in the highway. In the first Maryland
case of this character, Garrett v. Lake Roland Elevated
Railway Co.,56 the plaintiff sought to enjoin the construc-
tion in front of his lot of a stone approach to the elevated
street car viaduct on Guilford Avenue. The approach was
eighty-three feet long and sixteen feet wide, in the mid-
dle of the street, leaving only ten feet of the street for
access to plaintiff's property. Applying the principles of
Cumberland v. Willison7 and O'Brien v. The Baltimore
Belt R. R. Co.,5 the Court held this injury to plaintiff's
access was consequential damage only and not a "tak-
ing" within Article III, Section 40 and denied the injunc-
tion. It may be noted, however, that since the statute
authorizing the construction expressly required the rail-
way company to pay damages for injuries to property,
plaintiff had an action at law under the statute.
More significant for present purposes, however, is the
case of Walters v. B. & 0. R. R.59 There, to eliminate rail-
road grade crossings in Baltimore a highway viaduct was
being erected along Hamburg Street with an approach
between Sharp and Howard passing in front of plaintiff's
lot and building. At that point, the approach, five feet
15 Cf. Judge Parke's statement in the later case of Brehm v. State Roads
Commission, 176 Md. 411, 422, 6 A. (2d) 378, 379 (1939) quoted infra circa
n. 85.
79 Md. 277, 29 A. 830, 24 L. R. A. 396 (1894).
Supra, n. 38.
Supra, n. 40.
'120 Md. 644, 88 A. 47 (1913).
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in height with an additional guard-rail above, and sup-
ported on a concrete pillar directly before plaintiff's en-
trance, ran within a few inches of his property. As the
Court said:
"The effect of this structure was to effectually bar
all ingress to and egress from the premises, unless by
means of a ladder from the second floor window to
the newly constructed foot-way."6
In addition, the loss of light and air made the first floor
damp and uninhabitable. Plaintiff claimed damages on
the ground that the deprivation of the use of his property
amounted to a taking.
After recognizing the general principle that the City
would not be liable for a change in grade of the street,
the Court continued:
" . But the owners of lots abutting upon
public streets have easements or rights in the street
which are valuable and are in addition to those which
they have with the general public. This is recognized
in our statute law which confers upon the City of Bal-
timore the power for laying out and closing up streets
by providing for compensation to such owners upon
the closing of an adjacent street. So in Van Witzen
v. Gutman, 79 Md. 405, where an alley was attempted
to be closed, thus taking from other abutting owners
their means of ingress to and egress from their prop-
erty through the alley to the public street, it was held,
that the right was a valuable one and could not be
taken for public use without compensation, and a for-
tiori not for private use. And in Townsend, Grace &
Co. v. Epstein, 93 Md. 537, the same rule was followed
where the interference was with regard to light and
air."61
Both of the cases cited, it should be noticed, involved
structures in or over the street by private individuals for
60 120 Md. 644, 652, 88 A. 47, 50 (1913).
1120 Md. 644, 655. 88 A. 47, 51 (1913). The view that as against the
public abutters have "easements or rights in the street . . . in addition to
those which they have with the general public" was expressly rejected,
and earlier dicta to that effect disapproved, in Krebs v. State Roads
Commn., 160 Md. 584, 592-3, 154 A. 131, 134-5 (1931). See supra, n. 30,
and infra, n. 76).
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their own benefit. Against such use of the street for a
private, non-highway purpose, the abutting owner has, of
course, a right to be protected. But this right to prevent
an individual from diverting the highway from public
highway purposes does not mean that the abutting owner
has a property right in the highway as against the public.
And no such special easement was necessary to decide
the case, since all access had been blocked.
This distinction the Court appears to recognize later
in its opinion, where, in referring to a New York case, it
states as the rule
"that an abutting owner cannot be deprived of the
street affording him access to his premises, unless
there is left for his use and enjoyment other suitable
means of access, or just compensation is paid him for
the deprivation of the same."6 2
In other words, as against the public, he is protected
from complete destruction of all means of access to his
property, but not the obstruction of access from a particu-
lar highway. Having found in this case that the struc-
ture cut off all access, the Court held, in accordance with
this rule, that so complete a destruction of use and enjoy-
ment amounted to a "taking" under the Constitution.
In M. & C. C. of Balto. v. Bregenzer,68 the Court reached
the opposite conclusion on somewhat different facts. There
the plaintiff's properties were nearer to the base of the
viaduct which merely blocked the light and air from the
cellar windows, and required changes in the front en-
trances. In denying recovery the Court took occasion to
state
"that the Court does not understand that it announced
a new legal principle in the Walters case, or that it
impaired in the slightest degree the settled principles
of law upon the subject it was dealing with. It merely
applied these principles to the facts of that case."4
e' 120 Md. 644, 656, 88 A. 47, 52 (1913) (italics added).
6 3 125 Md. 78, 93 A- 425 (1915).64125 Md. 78, 83, 93 A. 425, 426 (1915).
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And after reviewing the prior cases, it concluded:
"In none of the cases is it held that mere inconven-
ience of access resulting from acts done, or mere dimi-
nution of light and air constitute a taking of private
property. The injury complained of must amount to
a substantial destruction of these rights before the pro-
visions of the Constitution can be invoked.
6 5
And in the latest viaduct case, Baltimore v. Himmel-
farb,66 seeking damages for interference with light and
air by the Orleans Street viaduct, the Court again em-
phasized this principle:
"The difficulty is the one long experienced from the
extension of meaning of 'taken', in decisions which
have allowed compensation when property has not
been actually appropriated for the public use, but its
use and enjoyment by the owners have been inter-
fered with in great degree. As distinctions between
possible interferences must be largely distinctions in
degree, complete uniformity in the precedents is not
to be found, and 'expressions used in the course of
argument in some of the opinions may, perhaps, be
difficult to reconcile with each other.' Krebs v. State
Roads Commission, 160 Md. 584, 593, 154 A. 131, 135.
But it results from the adjudications that compensa-
tion may be exacted only for severe interferences
which are tantamount to deprivations of use or en-
joyment of property .... The use has then, in effect,
been taken from the private owners, although the
property has not been taken over into the possession
and use of the public. Injury short of such incidental
destruction or deprivation is not compensable." 67
Consequently in that case, no "taking" resulted from the
interference.
Highway Closings or Relocations
In the final category are cases where the closing or re-
location of a street or highway has adversely affected the
access to property along the highway.
"125 Md. 78, 87, 93 A. 425, 427 (1915).60172 Md. 628, 192 A. 595 (1937).
"172 Md. 628, 630-1, 192 A. 595, 597 (1937).
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Passing over the case of M. & C. C. of Balto. v. Bren-
gle,11 which turned on whether the closing of a diagonal
street was for a public or private purpose rather than on
the right to compensation, the first case in this group is
Germ. Luth. Church v. Baltimore.69 There the church,
school and parsonage were located at the corner of Eutaw
and Henrietta Streets and to eliminate the grade crossing
over the B. & 0. tracks to the east, the City closed Hen-
rietta Street east of Eutaw, leaving Eutaw entirely open
and Henrietta open in front of the 'church property. The
church sued, claiming that the more circuitous route to-
ward the city caused the loss of membership and prop-
erty value. Citing the earlier grading cases, the Court
drew the familiar distinction between consequential dam-
age and a "taking", and pointed out that even in cases of
private obstruction, damages are recoverable only where
the sole means of access is closed.
Huffman v. State Roads Commn.,70 and Ragan v. Sus-
quehanna Power Co.,71 apply the same principle to essen-
tially similar facts. In the first, the landowner was de-
nied damages for the relocation of a bridge and its ap-
proaches to a site less convenient for his use. In the Ragan
case, a tow road along the edge of the Susquehanna River
which provided plaintiff with convenient access to various
points was flooded by the defendant's dam and plaintiff
was forced to use the much more circuitous upland route.
He claimed damages "because the comparative inconven-
ience in being forced to take the longer road has deprived
him of some part of the value of his land", but the Court
rejected the claim, saying:
"But it is settled that subjection to such incon-
venience does not amount to a taking, and so deprive
the owner of legal rights. '72
116 Md. 342, 81 A. 677 (1911). At the end of its opinion, however,
the Court remarked that "of course, a street cannot be closed even for
a public purpose without just compensation to those entitled to it". On
this point, see infra, n. 78.123 Md. 142, 90 A. 983 (1914).
7. 152 Md. 566, 137 A. 358 (1927).
71 157 Md. 521, 146 A. 758 (1929).
72 157 Md. 521, 527, 146 A. 758, 760 (1929).
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Because of its rigorous application of this rule and its
extensive discussion of the abutting owner's rights, the
case of Krebs v. State Roads Commn.,7 ' deserves the clos-
est attention. There the plaintiff's store was located on
the York Road just west of the railway grade crossing over
which the road passed in entering the town of Parkton.
Eighty per cent of plaintiff's trade came from customers
living on the opposite side of the tracks in Parkton and
much of the remainder from persons on their way into
Parkton. To eliminate'the grade crossing, the State Roads
Commission relocated the road to the south and built an
overpass and then closed the grade crossing. Consequently,
plaintiff's store was left on a cul-de-sac instead of a through
road, and the distance from the store to the town was in-
creased from several hundred feet to three-quarters of a
mile. Plaintiff sought to enjoin this as a "taking".
Despite the severe damage, the Court denied recovery.
In reaching this decision, the Court, in an opinion by Chief
Judge Bond, passed on several important points:
(1) After pointing out that the change had been made
under statutory authority, the opinion distinguished cases
based on nuisances caused by a public body, or neglect of
public duties to repair, or obstructions by non-highway
uses.
(2) The Court then distinguished the Walters and San-
derson cases on the ground that they decided that to de-
prive an abutting owner "of access to and from the street
in front ' 74 amounted to a "taking", and that this was not
done here. More precisely, it is believed, those cases
turned on a deprivation of all access rather than merely
that in front; this is also implicit in the holding in the
Dobler case that cutting off access to one of two front
streets was not a taking.
(3) The Court rejected the theory of some jurisdic-
tions that leaving the property on a cul-de-sac was a tak-
ing, observing that it was difficult to distinguish such a
situation "from the cutting off of access on one of two
73160 Md. 584, 154 A. 131 (1931).
71 160 Md. 584, 589, 154 A. 131, 134 (1931) (italics added).
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fronts, or from the reduction of wide adjacent streets to
narrow passages, none of which latter disadvantages have
been found to constitute takings of the properties for pub-
lic use in the constitutional sense. ' 75 It is rather a mat-
ter of greater inconvenience of access, as in the German
Lutheran Church case or the Ragan case, although in a
more severe form and with more serious financial losses.
(4) Expressly repudiating contrary dicta in several
earlier cases, the Court specifically held that an abutting
owner had no special private easement or property in
the road against the public. Observing that the change
had been made for the benefit of the general public, the
Court stated:
"It could not be said that the property of any of
these users-at least property not actually deprived
of all access-is to be taken, unless it can be said that
the location of the public easement at that site gave
them superimposed property rights against the pub-
lic as a whole. And this, we think, it did not do." 6
(5) Finally, referring to the dictum in Baltimore v.
Brengle 7 that "a street cannot be closed even for a pub-
lic purpose without just compensation to those entitled
to it", the Court said:
"But, assuming full authorization by statute for
the closing without allowance of compensation, the
claim could rest on no basis other than that of the
constitutional prohibition against a taking without
compensation; and such a taking, we find, is not in-
volved in the surrender or transfer of the public ease-
ment in this case. 78
The very recent case of Brehm v. State Roads Comm.
79
reaffirms and applies these principles. There the plain-
tiff's farm was located on a private side road which crossed
the adjacent railroad tracks of the Pennsylvania and ran
a short distance to the new Philadelphia Road. The Coun-
75 160 Md. 584, 590, 154 A. 131, 134 (1931).
76 160 Md. 584, 593, 154 A. 131, 135 (1931).
" Supra, n. 68.
78 160 Md. 584, 595, 154 A. 131, 136 (1931).
70 176 Md. 411, 5 A. (2d) 820, 6 A. (2d) 378 (1939).
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ty Commissioners acquired the road, covenanting to keep
it open. The State Roads Commission, after various pro-
ceedings then took over the road, closed the crossing and
substituted a viaduct almost a mile to the south, increas-
ing plaintiff's route to the Philadelphia road by about a
mile. Aside from objections to the proceedings, plaintiff
sought to enjoin the closing on the ground that (1) this
added distance and inconvenience amounted to a taking;
(2) the fact that the new viaduct was so distant and re-
stricted to eight ton shipments was unreasonable; and
(3) the closing was fraudulent in view of the covenant
to keep the road open. In rejecting all three grounds the
Court made several significant statements. Following the
prior cases in holding the inconvenience and added dis-
tance were not a taking, the Court passed to the validity
of locating the new viaduct "so far to the south", saying
"the majority consider it impossible for a court to hold
on the evidence that the commission's determination,
in the exercise of the State's police power, is unreason-
able and extravagant, and that the convenience and
rights of the landowners are arbitrarily disregarded."80
Where there is no taking, it would appear that the land-
owner's "convenience and rights are arbitrarily disre-
garded" only if the public action is not reasonably related
to promotion of a public purpose. But as applied to high-
ways, this is unlikely to occur in practice except where
the sole motive is private benefit;" otherwise a wide lati-
tude is permitted.8 2 In disposing of the third claim on the
ground that any fraud in acquiring the road would not
affect the closing of the crossing, the Court said:
80176 Md. 411, 419, 5 A. (2d) 820, 823 (1939). Presumably, Judges
Offutt and Delaplaine, who dissented without opinion, disagreed with the
majority on this point.
81 Such action for private benefit would, of course, violate the prin-
ciple established by the cases cited 8upra, n. 27.
" See Murphy v. State Roads Comm'n., 159 Md. 7, 149 A. 566 (1930)
(Commission's selection of road location not subject to judicial review
if (1) for public purpose and (2) discretion honestly exercised). Also
see infra, n. 90. Cf. Twilley v. Perkins, 77 Md. 252, 26 A. 286, 39 A. S.
R. 408, 19 L. R. A. 632 (1893); Bradley v. Public Utilities Commission,
289 U. S. 92, 77 L. Ed. 1053, 53 S. Ct. 577 (1933).
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"He appears to have had at most an easement over
the tracks and beyond, and even if the road over his
land had continued in private ownership, the State,
by its authorized agency, could have acquired the road
over the tracks and beyond, and once owning it could
have removed the crossing in the exercise of its police
power."' 3
Thus the destruction of his private easement in one direc-
tion would not be a taking where use in the other direction
remains.14
Finally, the supremacy of the public rights in the high-
way was strongly stated by Judge Parke in his concur-
ring opinion, in which, after referring to the conversion
of the private way into a public road, he wrote:
"... The rights and obligations of the plaintiff
must be determined with reference to the rights and
obligations of the public in the way thus created.
• . . The grantor must be held to have known that
the county commissioners could not covenant against
the exercise of the police power or of its discretion-
ary power to change, alter or close, whenever the
proper occasion arose, the highway in accordance with
the public welfare, safety or convenience.1'8 5
The fact that the landowner had donated the right of way
and obtained the covenant in order to forestall the closing
forcefully emphasizes the strength of the principle.
IV.
From a consideration and comparison of these various
cases, several conclusions as to the rights of the abutting
owner appear justified.
(1) If the abutting owner is totally deprived of all
access to his property by changes in the highway or other
measures, he is entitled to compensation for a taking. The
cases of DeLauder v. Baltimore County,86 Walters v. Balti-
88 176 Md. 411, 420, 5 A. (2d) 820, 824 (1939).
6 Cf. DeLauder v. Baltimore County, supra, n. 35.
85 176 Md. 411, 422, 6 A. (2d) 378, 379 (1939) (italics added). Judge
Johnson concurred in Judge Parke's separate opinion.
10 Supra, n. 35.
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more & Ohio R. R. Co.,87 and Sanderson v. Baltimore City,88
establish this rule. This is based on the fact that a total
destruction of access so completely destroys the use and
enjoyment of the property by the owner that, as by a flood-
ing, he is practically deprived of the property itself. It
is the total loss of practical use and not the depreciation
in value which is determinative.
(2) Short of total loss of access, however, the abutting
owner has only a qualified privilege of access to any high-
way, subordinate to the paramount right of the public to
its use and protection; he does not have a special easement
or other private property right in the highway different
from that of any other member of the public. This is the
express holding of Krebs v. State Roads Commission89
and is implicit in the cases referred to there.
(3) Consequently, so long as some reasonable means
of access is preserved, the public may restrict or destroy
the access of an abutting owner to a particular road by
any measures designed to maintain, improve or preserve
the highway or to protect its users, without paying him
compensation or damages. Since the abutting owner has
no private property or easement in the highway as against
the public, the restriction of his access can amount to a
taking only when its effect is to deprive him of the use
and enjoyment of the property itself. From the cases
discussed, it is apparent that greater inconvenience of ac-
cess, or reduction in accessibility, or relegation to a single
route or much longer route do not amount to a "taking",
even though the value of the property is seriously im-
paired. Both the Krebs case and the Dobler case rigor-
ously apply this doctrine despite its obvious hardship. In
the light of the cases and as a practical matter, the prop-
erty of the abutter is not "taken" so long as any reason-




"Supra, n. 73. Even where compensation Is payable, however, the
amount should be limited to the cost of providing an alternate means of
access. See Webb v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 114 Md. 216, 232, 79
A. 193, 197 (1910).
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If these conclusions are sound, it seems apparent that,
in order to protect the users of the highway from acci-
dent hazards and congestion, the State could either se-
verely restrict or abolish the privilege of access by the
abutting owner along heavily travelled main highways
without payment of compensation except where all ac-
cess to the property was thereby prevented. That the
promotion of highway safety and convenience is a proper
purpose is too. obvious to require citation or argument.
That restriction of access will tend to promote these ob-
jectives conforms to common experience and can be clearly
demonstrated. The conclusion therefore follows that lim-
itation of the abutter's access for these purposes would
give no right to damages unless all access was cut off.
V.
If such restriction of access is not a "taking" within
the Maryland Constitution, it would not constitute a depri-
vation of property without due process under the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. This was
decided by the Supreme Court in Sauer v. New York.90
There, the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York,
that a highway viaduct fifty feet in height interfering with
access to the abutter's property did not constitute a tak-
ing, was claimed to violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
but the Supreme Court rejected this contention on the
ground that the New York Court's determination of the
nature of the abutter's rights was conclusive and binding
for the purposes of the Federal Constitution.
9o 206 U. S. 536, 51 L. Ed. 1176, 27 S. Ct. 686 (1907). In Krebs v. State
Roads Commission the Court said (160 Md. 584, 588, 154 A. 131, 133
(1931)): "Narrowing the controversy still further, the court does not
see in the prohibit ions of the United States Constitution and that of the
State, against deprivation of property without due process of law, any
ground for relief not included in the requirement of article 3, section
40A, of the State Constitution, that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation to the property owner. ...
In many decisions it has been held that, given an authorization by stat-
ute, the only limitation upon the power of the public body to proceed is
that found in this prohibition against legislation for taking private prop-
erty without compensation. The prohibitions against deprivation of prop-
erty without due process of law have, indeed, been regarded as hav-
ing the same effect in such case."
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To attempt to review the decisions in other jurisdic-
tions as to interference with access would serve no use-
ful purpose. The diversity and confusion existing on this
topic were well described by the Supreme Court in the
Sauer case, where it said:
"The right of an owner of land abutting on public
highways has been a fruitful source of litigation in
the courts of all the States, and the decisions have been
conflicting, and often in the same State irreconcilable
in principle. The courts have modified or overruled
their own decisions, and each State has in the end fixed
and limited, by legislation or judicial decision, the
rights of abutting owners in accordance with its own
view of the law and public policy." 91
Because of the comparative recency of the acute acci-
dent and traffic problem, relatively few cases dealing with
direct restrictions on the abutter's access have arisen as
yet, but the decisions on this question in each jurisdic-
tion will naturally follow whatever doctrines that juris-
diction has adopted in the grading, viaduct, change of
location, and related cases. Thus, in the many states where
the Constitution provides for compensation for "damage"
to private property for a public purpose, the decision will
presumably be controlled by that provision.2
Attention may, however, be called to the fact that sev-
eral jurisdictions have upheld such direct restriction of
vehicular access to abutting property under the condi-
tions discussed above. In Missouri,93 Pennsylvania 94 and
Virginia95 such restriction has been sanctioned for the pro-
motion of convenience and safety. In each case the City
1 206 U. S., 536, 548, 51 L. Ed., 1176, 1182, 27 S. Ct. 686, 689 (1907).
"' Under such constitutional provisions, added inconvenience of access
resulting from public structures narrowing but not blocking the street
has been held "damage" requiring compensation. See e. g., McCandless
v. City of Los Angeles, 47 P. (2d) 1103 (Cal. App. 1935) ; Cummings v.
City of Minot, 67 N. D. 214, 271 N. W. 421 (1937). 1 ELLIOTT, ROADS AND
STRErS (4th ed. 1926) Sec. 237.
Fowler v. City of Nelson, 213 Mo. Ap. 82, 246 S. W. 638 (1923).
Farmers-Kissinger Market House Co. v. City of Reading, 310 Pa.
493, 165 A. 398 (1933). Cf. Valmont Developing Co. v. Rosser, 297 Pa.
140, 146 A. 557 (1929) ; and Breinig v. County of Allegheny, 332 Pa. 474,
2 A. (2d) 842 (1938) (closing of only means of access enjoined).
11 Wood v. City of Richmond, 148 Va. 400, 138 S. E. 560 (1927).
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had refused or revoked a permit for a means of access to
a busy street from abutting property for the use of a ga-
rage, filling station or parking space, but in each case other
means of access to the property were available from an-
other street. The Court in each case sustained the re-
fusal or revocation on the ground that the abutter's right
of access could be regulated and restricted in the interest
of public safety and convenience so long as all means of
access were not cut off.9 6
In conclusion it may be well to emphasize that this
article has dealt only with the constitutional power of
the state to limit the abutting owner's access in the pub-
lic interest without compensation for resulting damage.
How far and in what cases that power should be exercised
is of course a matter of legislative policy beyond the scope
of this article. Undoubtedly, such restriction along heavily
travelled ways will cause serious depreciation of some of
the abutting land, but there are several balancing factors.
In the first place such restrictions could in practice be
applied only to relatively new or undeveloped roads. On
older main routes, where substantial commercial devel-
opment has already occurred with the resulting subdivi-
sion into small parcels, the main road is frequently the
sole means of access, so that the cost of providing alter-
90 See also, Alger v. City of Lowell, 85 Mass. 402 (1862); Thompson
v. City of Boston, 212 Mass. 211, 98 N. E. 700 (1912) ; and consider cases
denying a right of access across park property to recreational drives,
Burke v. Metropolitan District Commission, 262 Mass. 70, 159 N. E. 739
(1928). But, under the circumstances described in the text, such re-
striction of access was held invalid in Brownlow v. O'Donoghue Bros.,
276 Fed. 636, 22 A. L. R. 939 (D. C. App. 1921), relying on Donovan v.
Pennsylvania Co., 199 U. S. 279, 302, 50 L. Ed. 192, 202, 26 S. Ct. 91,
97 (1905) as "binding". But the cited case dealt with private interfer-
ence with access and is therefore inapplicable to public regulation for
the reasons already discussed.
In many cases, the restrictions on access were imposed by adminis-
trative action and were held to exceed the statutory authority con-
ferred. Anzalone v. Metropolitan District Commission, 2:57 Mass. 32,
153 N. E. 325, 47 A. L. R. 897 (1926) ; Metropolitan District Commission
v. Cataldo, 257 Mass. 38, 153 IN. E. 328 (1926) ; Gleason v. Metropolitan
District Commission, 270 Mass. 377, 170 N. E. 395 (1930) ; Goodfellow
Tire Co. v. Commissioner of Parks, etc., 163 Mich. 249, 128 N. W. 410
(1910); Greeley Sightseeing Co. v. Riegelmann, 119 Misc. Rep. 84, 195
N. Y. S. 845 (1922); In re Singer-Kaufman Realty Co., 196 N. Y. S.
480 (1922) ; Marshall v. Blackpool Corp. [1933], 1 K. B. 688; [1933]
2 K. B. 339; [1935] A. C. 16. Turning on the lack of statutory power,
these cases are inapplicable on the question of constitutional power.
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nate access or compensation would be prohibitive. If newer
and uncommercialized roads are so restricted, however,
other means of access would probably be available or easily
provided, and the owner will largely suffer only the loss
of an unearned increment in land value; the restriction
merely takes away the value which the construction of the
road created. Moreover, this is particularly true today
when the cost of roads is borne by the automobile user
through the gasoline and motor taxes and not by the land-
owner. The loss of such an unearned speculative profit,
which impairs the public usefulness of the highway does
not present a particularly appealing claim for compensa-
tion. Nevertheless, if the legislature feels differently, it
could of course still provide for such compensation as it
deemed fair, although not constitutionally required to
do so.
